Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Nigeria: Defining a New Approach to Winning Modern Jihadist Conflict

STEVEN E. HENDRIX*

I. Introduction

A plume of smoke billows from what used to be the mosque. Dead male bodies lay in the street in various states of undress and mutilation. The women and children have been taken off. Community leaders—the imam, the mayor, respected elders—have been impaled, the bank looted, the school burned, the jailhouse opened, and the prisoners freed to join the insurgents. The town is dead. This is the suffering of countless communities across Borno State and parts of Yobe, Adamawa, and Gombe states in northeastern Nigeria over these past three years.¹

How can Nigeria defeat terrorism? This is a pivotal time to ask. Over the past six years, Boko Haram has killed over 20,000 people.² It captured the world’s attention when, in 2011, it blew up part of the United Nations offices in Abuja, the capital, with a suicide bomb.³ In April 2014, it took

¹ Steven E. Hendrix is the Strategy, Budget and Program Office Director in Nigeria with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). He is also a Senior Research Fellow with the DePaul University College of Law International Human Rights Law Institute, co-chair of the National Security Committee of the American Bar Association, International Section, and a member of the Section’s Council. The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the opinion of USAID or the U.S. Government. This article is based on the presentation on Boko Haram made at the panel on “The Islamic State and International Terrorism: The Architecture of Response” Chaired by Jonathan Meyer, at the American Bar Association, Section of International Law meetings in New York (Apr. 2016).


control of the small Christian town of Chibok, kidnapping 276 school girls, leading to the international #bringbackourgirls campaign championed by U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama. In early 2015, the jihadist group declared itself a caliphate, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Boko Haram now, sometimes, calls itself the Islamic State of West Africa), and controlled an area larger than West Virginia or Belgium.

Contrary to what popular media would have us believe, Boko Haram is currently the world’s most deadly terrorist organization, killing 6,600 in 2014, more than the Islamic State. The guerilla outfit has struck in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, but is based mainly in Nigeria where it carries out asymmetrical bombings and attacks across the northern half of the country and conventional assaults particularly in the northeast. In towns like Mubi, Adamawa State, there are no Christian churches left. Nevertheless, contrary to popular wisdom, three-quarters of Boko Haram victims are


Muslim. It uses a few towns and the Sambisa Forest in southern Borno State as its safe haven and base of operations.

At the time of the Chibok kidnapping, then-President Goodluck Jonathan's administration was toothless in the fight. When military and governmental leadership siphoned off too much in graft, Jonathan's armed forces lacked food or bullets and sometimes went without pay. When a group of soldiers took matters into their own hands by detaining a local commander to protest their plight, the response was to court-martial the soldiers and hand out the death penalty to the "mutineers" (later commuted to ten-year sentences). But no one was prosecuted for stealing the military funding that caused the "revolt."

In 2014, Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala called donor organizations to an urgent meeting to tell them to stop talking about Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees because it was projecting a negative investment climate. Public teachers and hospital workers went months without pay. Long gas lines remained for months at the few petrol stations that actually sold gas—the result of embezzlement of funds to pay for subsidized gasoline. When the Central Bank President presented a report documenting the theft of billions of dollars from the Petroleum Ministry, President Jonathan removed him.

But change came. In 2015, President Jonathan tried to delay elections, but was thwarted not only by coordinated actions by the European Union, Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, but also by public opinion. For the first time in Nigerian history, an opposition candidate for

---

13. Id.
16. See id.
19. Id.
20. Press Release, Secretary of State John Kerry, Postponement of Elections in Nigeria (Feb. 7, 2015), [http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237290.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237290.htm) (noting that the United States was "deeply disappointed by the decision to postpone Nigeria's presidential election, which had been scheduled for February 14"). Coordinated U.S. and E.U. diplomacy followed this statement to get Nigeria back on track. See id.
president defeated an incumbent in what was a mostly free and fair contest.\textsuperscript{21} When President Jonathan considered postponing the transition, international pressure and Nigerian public opinion again intervened to assure the changeover.\textsuperscript{22}

The new president, Muhammadu Buhari, ran on a campaign to end corruption and terrorism.\textsuperscript{23} His challenge now is to defeat Boko Haram, even as he sets governance on a new course.\textsuperscript{24} Yet, even if Nigeria were to defeat Boko Haram on the battlefield, another group could emerge tomorrow to take its place.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, President Buhari must defeat the underlying causes of the conflict—the factors that drive young, disaffected, alienated men and women, boys and girls, to join Boko Haram in the first place.\textsuperscript{26}

Nigeria is important as a global experiment on how to fight Jihadist extremism. Like many countries facing violent extremism, Nigeria today is a hollowed out state, following decades of pervasive corruption and neglect of governance.\textsuperscript{27} “We used to be a proud people,” as one Nigerian professor put it.\textsuperscript{28} Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq, where the U.S. was willing to spend

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
billions, that fiscal willingness to intervene is unlikely to be repeated often. As the struggle for the heart of global Islam continues and, as countries look to better share the benefits of democratic society, these conflicts are emerging from Libya to Egypt to Mali. Nigeria looks like the front line of a new engagement approach. Nigeria could well define a successful approach to contain conflict and incubate alternatives to violence.

II. Why Become a Nigerian Terrorist?

Nigeria has the largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Africa and is the United States’ largest African trading partner, making it one of the wealthiest in Africa. But its income distribution is highly skewed, leaving the vast majority in poverty. It is also poorly governed. For years, the central government ignored the humble Northeast. Ten and a half million Nigerian school-aged children are out of school, more than any other country in the world, with the North having more out-of-school children than the South. For the kids who do go to public schools, the quality of that education is dismal. For the few that manage to graduate from primary school, only a quarter of those go on to secondary school.

38. Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children, supra note 36, at vi.
Only a quarter of Nigerians are fully immunized\(^9\) and a third of all deaths in the world for malaria are in Nigeria.\(^{40}\) One-fourth of northern children will die before their fifth birthday due to preventable illnesses. The malaria prevalence rate is forty-two percent. Seventy-seven million Nigerians lack safe drinking water, and ninety-five million lack electricity.\(^{41}\) One hundred million Nigerians lack toilets and only two percent have running water.\(^{42}\)

Startlingly, despite the discovery of oil in the 1970s, Nigerians today are twice as likely to be poor as they were thirty years ago.\(^{43}\) While half of Nigeria’s population is under the age of thirty,\(^{44}\) the North is younger still.\(^{45}\) The country has installed the capacity to generate 12,000 megawatts of electricity, but,\(^{46}\) due to corruption and inefficiency, can only muster 3,800 megawatts at any one time,\(^{47}\) and even that is with frequent blackouts.\(^{48}\) Sixty percent of Nigerians live below $1.25 per day, with most of them again being in the North.\(^{49}\) Joblessness and hopelessness are most acute in the Northeast.\(^{50}\)

In conflicts like Nigeria’s northeast, in so-called “asymmetric warfare,” civilians are no longer bystanders: they are the battlefield, the objective, and

---


41. Obinna F. Muoh, When 95 million Nigerians are living without electricity something needs to change, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/95-million-nigerians-are-living-without-electricity-and-something-needs-to-change-2016-7.


44. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey: Nigeria, supra note 39, at xiv.


target.\textsuperscript{51} When taking a town, Boko Haram's modus operandi is to gather up all traditional religious and political leaders, regardless of their professed faith, and kill them.\textsuperscript{52} Combining asymmetrical attacks with conventional combat into hybrid warfare, Boko Haram burns down the police station and tears down any structure that implies authority.\textsuperscript{53} The message is clear: the new authority is Boko Haram. They take over the local mosques and preach their new ideology—one of hate and conflict, a narrative filled with victimization, suffering, and vengeance.\textsuperscript{54} They burn down prisons and liberate those who would join them.\textsuperscript{55} Put succinctly, Boko Haram cannot be defeated until the civilian population is fully protected.\textsuperscript{56}

Fleeing Boko Haram are 2.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)\textsuperscript{57} and tens of thousands more in refugees escaping the conflict zone.\textsuperscript{58} November 2015 marked the third year in a row that displaced persons were unable to plant their crops, exacerbating a food security crisis.\textsuperscript{59} Much of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa States, and informal settlements in greater Maiduguri (capital of Borno State) are expected to be in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification “Crisis” (IPC Phase 3) through mid-2016.\textsuperscript{60} Nigeria’s northeast has 1.5 million malnourished children under five years old.\textsuperscript{61} In the hardest hit areas, malnutrition rates for children less than five


\textsuperscript{52} See id. For a chronicle of the rise of Boko Haram, see Kevin Uhrmacher & Mary Beth Sheridan, The brutal toll of Boko Haram’s attacks on civilians, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/nigeria-boko-haram/.

\textsuperscript{53} See Falode, supra note 51.

\textsuperscript{54} See id. Women, in particular, suffer as victims. See Kevin Sieff, They were freed from Boko Haram’s rape camps. But their nightmare isn’t over, WASH. POST, (Apr. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/they-were-freed-from-boko-harams-rape-camps-but-their-nightmare-isnt-over/2016/04/03/dbf2aab0-e54f-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html.

\textsuperscript{55} See Falode, supra note 51.


\textsuperscript{58} See id. at 3. While the international donor community worked with a 2.3 million figure, an official report put the estimate at 2.1 million. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Consolidated Report of the 2nd Regional Security Summit Meeting of Experts Between the 12th to the 13th of May 2016 at 5 (May 2016).


\textsuperscript{60} Nigeria: Emergency Food Security Assessment, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME at 2 (May 2016), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp285922.pdf.

years old surpass the World Health Organization’s threshold for "emergency." With poor water and unsanitary conditions, most deaths are from diarrheal illness rather than BH bullets. Cholera lurks not only in the IDP camps, but also in the communities that host IDPs.

The conflict has produced the world’s biggest camp of displaced persons. Just a few years ago, Maiduguri was once a city of just less than a million inhabitants. Today, it has more than two million – the change being an influx of IDPs. This has overwhelmed the city and its infrastructure. Everywhere there are people standing, doing nothing. While no one knows for sure, the best guess calculations show that, at best, only ten percent of IDPs receive food assistance. How are the other ninety percent surviving? Security conditions on the ground do not allow humanitarian relief workers to go to Maiduguri and find out.

This misery invites disaffection. And Boko Haram uses that to lure recruits. With high unemployment in the North and Northeast, youth lack opportunity. Meanwhile, Boko Haram pays its volunteers. Boko Haram gives its members a feeling of belonging, of family. It gives its

62. Id. at 2.
68. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
members hallucinate drugs both for recreation and for fighting. Boko Haram combatants get a feeling of adventure and power from their exploits. In traditional African culture, older and wealthier men get the marriageable women and poor, male youth lack a clear path to marriage. Boko Haram kidnaps girls and gives them to its soldiers as brides. Boko Haram men brand their female victims with tattoos to show ownership and to remind the victims to whom they belong. Drugs and human trafficking make up part of the economy for the insurgents.

Boko Haram also uses forced conscripts. Boko Haram kidnaps boys and girls and presses them into service. These child soldiers are then hardened through ideology and trauma. If they try to leave, they are often told their family members will be tortured and killed. Boko Haram has used children to blow up markets, mosques, and bus stations. Once children are in Boko Haram, their former communities are loath to take them back, fearing that they have been lost to the guerillas and their way of thinking. That child soldiers are victims is not the way communities think about them.

While the vast majority of Boko Haram fighters come from the illiterate poor, usually the Hausa or Kanuri tribes, some are more educated and become radicalized through extremist ideology. Traditional Muslim mullahs and religious leaders denounce Boko Haram, but often pay for that with their lives. One outspoken critic of Boko Haram, the Emir of Kano,


77. Id.

78. See “Motivations and Empty Promises”, supra note 76, at 8.

79. Id.


81. See “Motivations and Empty Promises”, supra note 76, at 11.

82. See id. at 14.

83. Id.

84. Id.

85. Id.

86. For further background on Former Boko Haram fighters, see generally “Motivations and Empty Promises”, supra note 76.


88. Id.
escaped death when an attack took place at his mosque when he just happened to be traveling out of the country.\textsuperscript{89}

The extremist theology often comes from Islamic Almajiri schools common in rural areas.\textsuperscript{90} These unregulated, itinerate schools are often led by self-proclaimed teachers who have students memorize verses from the Koran while having the kids panhandle to collect money to pay the teachers.\textsuperscript{91} In some cases, the schools radicalize the youth, teaching an intolerant brand of Islam, sometimes with non-canonical texts with eschatological interpretations.\textsuperscript{92} This fuels a supply of potential Boko Haram fighters infused with religious conviction and a sense of righteousness, regardless of whether the interpretation is authentic or not.\textsuperscript{93}

III. Immediate Issues

In December 2014, President Jonathan announced that the conflict would end—an obvious electoral ploy.\textsuperscript{94} But he may have actually believed it if that is what his generals promised. When President Buhari made a similar three month pledge in May 2015 and again in August, he too probably believed it.\textsuperscript{95} But guerilla wars are never like that. They tend to require a more integrated, holistic, longer approach.\textsuperscript{96} This is not just about the conventional threat from Boko Haram in terms of clearing militants and IEDs from the Sambisa Forest, but rather protecting the civilian population from asymmetrical attacks.\textsuperscript{97} The Nigerian military is capable of fighting the conventional struggle and, if given the right policy and leadership context, can succeed in the longer term asymmetrical warfare.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[90] See THURSTON, supra note 87, at 15.
\item[91] Id.
\item[92] Id.
\item[93] For an interesting overview of the beliefs of Boko Haram fighters, see generally THURSTON, supra note 87.
\item[94] This was not the first time President Jonathan had promised quick resolution of the threat. See Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan Vows to Defeat Boko Haram, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30652581.
\end{footnotes}
Local populations in the northeast have formed the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide community self-defense, reinforce military operations, and help the military to separate out who are really Boko Haram as opposed to victims; while in the short term the CJTF is a welcome addition to the Nigerian force, it is an irregular and undisciplined force with potential for human rights abuses. In the longer term, if Boko Haram is defeated, the CJTF will have to be demobilized and reintegrated. The Borno Governor has already started planning for this by proposing ways some of these fighters could be merged into the formal security structure. Still this remains a concern.

While Boko Haram is based overwhelmingly in Nigeria, it does have activities in the Lake Chad region involving Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. These three countries, plus Benin and Nigeria, have all contributed troops to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which has received technical support from France, Britain, and the United States. Given Nigeria’s history of participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, Nigeria will welcome the MNJTF so long as it remains under Nigerian command. International efforts to add an additional African Union force are unlikely to pan out given Nigeria’s sovereignty interests. Nigeria has, however, brought in mercenaries from South Africa to augment its own force and provide additional training and leadership.

101. See id.
105. See id.
IV. Transition and Governance

Asymmetrical warfare is no longer like the wars of old, when one side surrendered to the other. In Nigeria, there will be no formal disarmament or peace deal and no laying down of arms in front of the cameras. There will be no United Nations observation or peace-keeping mission. In fact, Nigeria has the opportunity to write the book on how to win asymmetrical warfare, advance peace and prosperity, and counter violent ideology.

For much of the past six years, there have been large parts of Nigeria's northeast where there has been no functional government. For decades, corruption and neglect meant that the region received little in terms of education, healthcare, infrastructure, electricity, or other public services. Given its size, it might be logical to assume that Nigeria had state capacity similar to Indonesia, Russia, or Brazil. But across Nigeria, public institutions have been hollowed out, with corrupt politicians taking away the spoils and neglecting the rot until the country got to this crisis. After twenty years of theft on a grand scale, Nigeria has been left without institutions or the ability to deliver. And it is still worse in the North and Northeast.

The Borno State Government had been in hands of the political party in opposition to the central President, meaning that party politics accentuated the divide. Today, that has changed. The governors in the Northeast are from the same political party as the presidency and the majority in the national congress. With a clearly articulated strategy from the president, the nation should be able to coalesce to concentrate effort in the frontline states and the North more broadly. Key to this will be tangible investments that yield benefits for people who are suffering most. Prominent themes that Nigerians will have to negotiate will be transitional justice, reintegration,
and terms for amnesty. Given that President Buhari indicated when elected that the treasury and central bank were bare, there is the challenge of budgetary resources needed to finance some of the proposals presented, and the World Bank and others have stepped in with lending options to cover at least part of the reconstruction cost.

V. Democracy Not Delivering for Ordinary Nigerians

So far, no government of Nigeria entity has managed the emergency effectively. President Jonathan’s Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) produced the President’s Initiative for the North East (PINE) and a related plan. The plan lacked prioritization, budget, sequencing or even ownership for operationalization. The governors’ rival North East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS) was produced when President Jonathan and the various northern governors were from different political parties. The PINE and NESTS plans were both desk studies without data or public consultation. A fresh Buhari plan now must integrate strategy and reflect both commitment and realism. Fortunately, President Buhari has formed a new President’s Commission on North East Interventions (PCNI) to undertake just such an effort, working much more closely with the donor community and across ministerial and organizational lines.

In charge, he named one of his personal confidants, the aging Gen. T.Y. Danjuma, who is now retired. President Buhari also moved operational programs from ONSA to the Vice President, allowing ONSA to concentrate on strategy and inter-institutional coordination. The new approach seems

---


calibrated to be more successful than what Nigeria had before under President Jonathan. Having said that, President Buhari is still beholden to an elder system in Nigeria in which, culturally, Nigerians must “wait” for a leader of anything—even a younger, better general or better administrator—because the culture gives deference to the elders. Outdated ideas continue to be used until someone is literally dead before new, modern ideas can be tried.

Part of the problem is trying to differentiate between damage from the insurgency and what was rotten beforehand. This will not be a program for “reconstruction,” but rather “construction.” For example, the schools were never in good shape before the conflict. In northern states, for example, many classrooms have dirt floors, lack desks or chairs, pencils, pens, or paper. Kids do not have bus transportation—they walk along unpaved roads and paths for miles to and from school. Girls risk abductions or rape on the journey. When they get to school, if there are latrines, there are not separate bathrooms for girls and boys. When teachers do show up, the quality of instruction is often dubious. Understandably, many parents think it was better for kids to start work and help the family rather than waste time in such miserable schools. “Boko

---

124. See generally Diane Lemieux, Nigeria - Culture Smart!: The Essential Guide to Customs & Culture (Geoffrey Chesler ed. 2011), available at https://books.google.com/books?id=abc-AQAQAQBAJ&pg=PT43&lpg=PT43&dq=nigeria+culture+deference+to+elders&source=bl&ots=5FOERAOH87&sig=VR5dctNH6LzC7I9emzJabAEEnZYF0hl&sq=5xved=0ahUKEwiYgJLojO3OAhVKzmMKThb1PA2QQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=nigeria%20culture%20deference%20to%20elders&f=false.

125. See Atane Ofoja, Why elders deserve only earned respect, THIS IS AFRICA (Mar. 6, 2014), http://thisisafrica.me/why-elders-deserve-only-earned-respect/.


132. See Watkins, supra note 128.

Haram” itself is sometimes translated as “western education is forbidden.”

If by “western education” northern families understand the education system they have, they could be forgiven for not valuing it. But now schools are even worse. Borno State schools have been closed for three years (albeit with limited openings in Maidauguri in November 2015). Many schools were burned and gutted; official records lost. The schools will need to be re-built, new teachers recruited (and paid!), and parents’ faith restored in the education system.

Healthcare faces similar challenges. One-fourth of the worldwide malaria cases are Nigerians. About half of Nigerians carry the disease, with even higher concentrations in the Northeast. Nigeria ranks among the top ten countries in terms of global tuberculosis (TB) burden, with an estimated 610,688 incident cases of TB in 2014. Only seventeen of one hundred cases are diagnosed and treated each year. If you are Nigerian and HIV positive and you are on treatment, that treatment is paid for by the U.S. Government via the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). In Bauchi State, for example, 35,637 are HIV positive and only 6,813 are on treatment – all paid for by PEPFAR. In other words, through 2015, the Nigerian government has invested close to zero to help its HIV positive population.

Among all African countries, only Nigeria still has polio. Thanks to the U.N. Global Fund, the Gates Foundation, Rotary International, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Nigeria has had

136. Segun, supra note 134.
137. Id.
141. See generally id.
massive polio vaccination campaigns. It has now gone one year without new reported cases, but it must go three years without a recurrence for the nation to be declared “polio free.” Again, this is thanks to foreign aid, not the Nigerian government.

If it were a separate country, northern Nigeria might be the worst place on the planet to be a woman. According to some estimates, there are one hundred million poor in Nigeria, skewed heavily toward the North, with many more women than men in poverty. In the North, most women are illiterate. Most marry between the ages of twelve and fourteen, drop out of school, and begin having children immediately. Not that staying in school is a solution. The Chibok girls were sitting for their final high school exams when they were kidnapped by Boko Haram. Because of the poor schools, most of those girls were still functionally illiterate and innumerate after having completed high school. Education systems are tailored to boys rather than girls. Violence against women, psychological and physical, remains chronic. Girls in the Northeast have on average 6.3 children, causing a demographic explosion. While Nigeria accounts for 2.48 percent of the globe’s population, it accounts for fourteen percent of its maternal deaths, again almost all concentrated in the North.

---

148. See Children’s Health Programme, supra note 146.
149. See generally Agabas Pwanagba, 70% of Nigerian women are living below poverty line-Minister, DAILY POST (July 13, 2013), http://dailypost.ng/2013/07/13/70-of-nigerian-women-are-living-below-poverty-line-minister/.
154. See Samusi Lamido reveals that 93% of girls are illiterate in northern Nigeria, supra note 151.
155. See id.
Approximately 150,000 women of reproductive age currently live with or have previously had obstetric fistula, a leading cause of death during childbirth. Women receive worse healthcare, nutrition, employment, and protection. This all must change.

These kinds of major infrastructure and systems changes will take time and fresh resources. Between the African Development Bank and the World Bank, Nigeria probably has more than a billion dollars in loans already approved by the Nigerian Congress sitting on the books of the Finance Ministry, set to execute, even while Nigeria assesses needs, prioritizes, and sequences future outlays. These existing resources should be applied immediately to address infrastructure and systems needs in the Northeast. Nigerians should also open a dialogue between the Presidency and the Congress on how to fund northeast development, respecting the federal (decentralized) system for service delivery and looking to use private sector service providers already in the Northeast to the extent possible—creating investment and jobs for local Nigerians of all stripes.

VI. “Every day is for the thief”

More than anything else, corruption made Boko Haram. It gave the organization a foil to rail against and a moral indignation. President Buhari will have to take that away by proving Nigeria can stop corruption. Already, President Buhari has given clear instructions to his new ministers that corruption will no longer be tolerated, ordered their motorcades cut, and reduced staff sizes. He has also reinvigorated a previously moribund anti-money laundering commission. But more than anything else, perhaps it is his leadership by example that is changing perceptions. He published his own personal income and wealth statements online and has a reputation

160. See generally Pwanagha, supra note 149; Sanusi Lamido reveals that 93% of girls are illiterate in northern Nigeria, supra note 151.
164. See generally id.
from his prior turn in office for not allowing abuse. He has also encouraged prosecutors to go after graft regardless of party affiliation. In December 2015, prosecutors charged the Jonathan administration’s National Security Adviser for stealing $2 billion in sham procurements for military equipment. If President Buhari can continue that emphasis, prosecute “big fish” for major theft, while putting systems in place that prevent what Nigerians call a “dash,” he will have made a major contribution to denying Boko Haram of one of its key talking points.

Impunity for human rights abuse has been another driver for Boko Haram. Innocent civilians picked up on the battlefield have been accused of being Boko Haram, imprisoned, and beaten without due process or access to an attorney. Some suspects die while in custody. In fact, it was the assassination while in police custody of Boko Haram’s early leader, Mohammed Yusuf, that was the tipping point, leading the group to turn from being a thuggish political group to an armed insurgency. Nigeria does not allow local or community policing because the earlier Biafra War, occurring from 1967 to 1970, left two million dead and showed the dangers of allowing states or local authorities to have their own armed forces.

VII. Policy Recommendations

To combat Boko Haram, the Nigerian government will need a phased strategy of intervention. In the immediate term, it will have to pacify the rural Northeast and take back territory. In the medium term, it needs to reconstitute governance. And, finally, it will have to invest in a longer term strategy to develop the region. The U.S. technical assistance can help assure it is successful.

173. See id.
174. See id.
The Nigerian military must defeat Boko Haram on the conventional battlefield. At the same time, Nigerian intelligence will have to work to infiltrate and prevent asymmetrical tactics like bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These efforts will require a professionalization of the military, intelligence, and police services.

To reduce the size of the Boko Haram force, Nigeria might look to support a defections program. In Colombia, such a program bled forces from the guerillas, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Key to this is assuring a path whereby combatants can turn themselves in without risk of being killed or hurt. The former fighters would have to give up their arms, renounce their former involvement, and share intelligence about their prior activities. Under such circumstances, a defection program can be a useful tool to reduce the size of enemy forces while demoralizing them at the same time. Without a defections program, fighters who want to lay down their arms have no escape and continue to fight.  

Nigeria will have to figure out how it can bring peace and security to its civilian population while professionalizing security services. That may not be as hard as it looks. A lot of “conventional wisdom” on conflict suggests that Nigeria should not use southern police or military in the Northeast. The logic suggests that this could give an ethnic, religious, or cultural spin to an already emotive conflict. Why add fuel to the fire? However, my trip to an IDP settlement put paid to that assumption. We asked if IDPs would welcome police or soldiers from the south. “Of course,” they replied. “We would recognize them instantly and know they were not Boko Haram.” Previously, Boko Haram would impersonate police or military and go to communities. When villagers volunteered information on the insurgents, Boko Haram would kill them as traitors. Southern law enforcement officers could be trusted in ways their fellow countrymen could not. The Nigerian army has a tradition of participation in peace-keeping operations.

around the globe. Fresh leadership and transparent funding could be the key to reinvigoration of that historic tradition.

Having said that, the Nigerian military cannot be expected to engage in military operations against Boko Haram while serving as the country’s de facto police force. The central government will have to figure out how to train and deploy more police. Nigeria has a quota system whereby if one region gets more funding, the other regions must also get a bump up in resources. So just sending 4,000 more police to the Northeast is not so easy without also coming up with similar numbers for all the other regions. Either the administration will have to figure out an exception, or it will have to stand up a much larger national force to pacify former Boko Haram areas. This might not be a bad idea, given other on-going conflicts in the Delta region (mainly over resource allocation) and Nigeria’s middle belt (pastoralists versus farmers).

Nigeria will be successful on the battlefield only if it also takes care of people in suffering. To do that, Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) will need to take a lead role in responding to the IDPs. To date, it has provided limited assistance to IDPs only in formal camps – about ten percent of the IDP population. Under President Jonathan, NEMA handed out bags of rice – confiscated from contraband importers, not actually from the government – in sacks with Jonathan’s political campaign logo on them. It was not a serious, comprehensive attempt to feed the displaced population. IDPs desperately need food, healthcare, education, and income. While the military make claims to have re-taken territory from Boko Haram, NEMA should not push IDPs to move back to their home communities until those IDPs feel it is safe enough to return. In northern Adamawa State, NEMA convinced IDPs to return to their former villages. When they were dropped off, they were left without protection. The next day, Boko Haram fighters returned and killed them. Some reports claim

185. See generally The IDP Situation in North-Eastern Nigeria: Displacement Tracking Matrix Report (DTM), supra note 70.
187. NEMA shuts down 6 IDPs camps in Adamawa, DAILY POST (May 12, 2016), http://daily post.ng/2016/05/12/nema-shuts-down-6-idps-camps-in-adamawa/.
refugees are being involuntarily repatriated from Cameroon.\textsuperscript{188} Involuntary movement of displaced persons violates international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{189} This cannot be allowed to happen again.

With the possible exception of the Federal Ministry of Health, the main line federal ministries have not taken ownership or leadership for emergency response and construction programs in the Northeast.\textsuperscript{190} That must change. The Education Ministry needs to demonstrate its leadership to get kids into school (not back in school—they never went in the first place). It also needs to get new teachers and pay them, dramatically improve quality, and assure that schools are assessable and safe. The Agriculture Ministry needs to help farmers get inputs for planting, improve market access, and make sure fields are safe from mines that Boko Haram may have left behind. The federal government needs to get families and businesses on the electric grid and then collect from them for usage. In general, the federal government ministries need to “have skin in the game” to show they are responsive to the population’s needs.

VIII. U.S. and International Roles

This conflict is not an American, European, or Asian problem. It is a Nigerian problem. And since Nigeria is not a poor country, it does not need American, European, or Asian financial resources. Nigeria does need technology transfer on how to cut corruption, improve government services, manage and execute budgets, and counter violent extremism. But, even so, Nigeria’s problem is not technical but political.\textsuperscript{191} Aid will only be effective to the extent it works within the political economy and reinforces (rather than substitutes for) political will to clean up government and improve services. To the extent aid agencies do become involved, much of the Northeast is a non-permissive environment—that is, for security reasons, aid workers cannot go to the hardest hit areas.\textsuperscript{192} In fact, outside of Maiduguri and a couple of big cities, most of Borno State will remain a “no go” zone for the foreseeable near future.\textsuperscript{193}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 190. See generally \textit{The Pine Long-Term Economic Reconstruction and Redevelopment Plan (Initiatives, Strategies and Implementation Framework)}, supra note 119.
\item 191. See \textquote{Nigeria's Problem is Simply the Failure of Political Leaders to Rebalance the Federation}, THIS DAY (Jul. 19, 2016), http://www.thisdailylive.com/index.php/2016/07/19/nigerias-problem-is-simply-the-failure-of-political-leaders-to-rebalance-the-federation/.
\item 193. See Haruna Umar, \textit{Nigerian president has exaggerated the military's success against Boko Haram, say officials after US commander testifies that Boko Haram still holds territory}, U.S. NEWS
\end{footnotes}
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the crisis should not come with their standard relief package—the recipe of what they always do in a conflict. This is not Somalia. Ninety percent of IDPs live with host communities, not in camps. While Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has done an adequate job providing basic necessities (mainly rice and cooking oil) to IDPs in camps, it has done about zero for the remaining IDP population. And most IDPs have been displaced now for a year, two years, or more. So the needs today are different than when the crisis started. Instead of parachuting in with water, sanitation, and health kits, NGOs need to first assess what is needed to have a people-level impact. Meeting directly with IDPs would be the best approach to assess their needs. Many will never return to their original home towns. They may want to stay where they are, or they may want to start a new life in a third location. The only way to find out is to ask. In this process, what will jump out is that this is not a pure humanitarian crisis. Nor is this a pure development problem. It is simultaneously both, and the response must recognize that complexity. Further, the NGO organizations themselves need to be staffed with both humanitarian and development experts, not just one or the other.

In September 2015, USAID signed a $2.3 billion, five-year agreement to support Nigeria. The agreement implements USAID/Nigeria's Country Development Cooperation Strategy providing humanitarian, transitional, and development programs. About eighty percent of the funding will focus on health. The balance is split between education, electrification, agriculture, and governance.

---

194. See generally Ben Agande, I was afraid Nigeria might be like Somalia, says Buhari, VANGUARD (Jun. 16, 2015), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/i-was-afraid-nigeria-might-be-like-somalia-says-buhari/.


200. See generally id.

201. See generally id.

202. See generally id.
In the immediate term, USAID is investing about $80 million in IDP shelter, sanitation, education, food assistance, and comprehensive healthcare for displaced populations and host communities. Taking advantage of the surprising fact that markets still seem to work in war-torn parts of the country, since October 2014, USAID has provided more than $20 million in food assistance to support approximately 150,000 individuals in Gombe, Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa States. Displaced populations and host community members are provided with cash or food vouchers to help meet their immediate food needs, supported by sensitization and nutrition messaging. Gone are the days when USAID imported sacks of rice! Today, the programs target geographic areas based on the IDP caseload and their impact on host communities, prioritizing households with IDPs, pregnant/lactating women, and children under the age of five. Vouchers-for-work activities will be featured as a second phase of the intervention to help rebuild and strengthen community assets. These activities represent first world technology adapted to IDP realities.

USAID's humanitarian investment in the Northeast represents about two-thirds of all international emergency aid. The European Union (E.U.) invests the remaining third. Nearly all international humanitarian assistance in the Northeast is paid for between the U.S. and the E.U., including the work being done by United Nations entities. Many Nigerians complain that the international community is not doing anything visible in the Northeast. That is true—the U.S. and E.U. do not brand their work for security reasons. Observers conclude what is being done must be paid for by the Nigerian government. To the extent the international community wants the Nigerian Government to be seen as viable in the Northeast, that misperception of lack of international involvement may actually be a positive thing.

IX. Final Thoughts

The Boko Haram problem will not be over quickly. Even if the military can root the insurgents from the Sambisa Forest, Boko Haram could also recamp to Cameroon, Chad, or Niger.

More likely, there will be more suicide bombing attacks, especially using girls. Such attacks do not require the holding of territory. A Nigerian military victory in the Sambisa Forest will not end the violence, but it will be a major step forward.

204. See generally id.
206. See generally id.
207. See generally id.
208. See generally id.
The Nigerian heroes are the IDPs and their host communities. The IDPs have been through hell. The host communities have been extremely generous, but are now exhausted. Neither has much food, healthcare, or income. IDPs that left their homes have neither land titles to show their ownership, nor titles to new land they now occupy. IDPs need a new chance at life—just a bit of help so they can help themselves. The current cash transfer program is allowing people to recover their dignity and regain self-reliance.

The long-term solution is to take away the drivers of the conflict. Nigeria must make tangible, measurable progress against corruption. It must make governance work to the benefit of its own citizens. Education, health, electricity, and economic diversification (mainly agriculture) have to be the Nigerian priorities. When the youth are educated and have jobs, when they feel they belong to broader Nigerian society and economics, then Boko Haram’s allure will come to its end. Foreign assistance can move this forward, but it cannot substitute for Nigerian leadership and investment.